Active Shooter Mitigation and Recovery Strategies

National Safe Skies Alliance, Inc.
Sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration
Salus Solutions

© 2020 National Safe Skies Alliance, Inc. All rights reserved.

COPYRIGHT INFORMATION

Authors herein are responsible for the authenticity of their materials and for obtaining written permissions from publishers or persons who own the copyright to any previously published or copyrighted material used herein.

National Safe Skies Alliance, Inc. (Safe Skies) grants permission to reproduce material in this publication for classroom and not-for-profit purposes. Permission is given with the understanding that none of the material will be used to imply Safe Skies or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) endorsement of a particular product, method, or practice. It is expected that those reproducing the material in this document for educational and not-for-profit uses will give appropriate acknowledgment of the source of any reprinted or reproduced material. For other uses of the material, request permission from Safe Skies.

NOTICE

The project that is the subject of this report was a part of the Program for Applied Research in Airport Security (PARAS), managed by Safe Skies and funded by the FAA.

The members of the technical panel selected to monitor this project and to review this report were chosen for their special competencies and with regard for appropriate balance. The report was reviewed by the technical panel and accepted for publication according to procedures established and overseen by Safe Skies.

The opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this report are those of the individuals or organizations who performed the research and are not necessarily those of Safe Skies or the FAA.

Safe Skies and the FAA do not endorse products or manufacturers.
NATIONAL SAFE SKIES ALLIANCE, INC.

National Safe Skies Alliance (Safe Skies) is a non-profit organization that works with airports, government, and industry to maintain a safe and effective aviation security system. Safe Skies’ core services focus on helping airport operators make informed decisions about their perimeter and access control security.

Through the ASSIST (Airport Security Systems Integrated Support Testing) Program, Safe Skies conducts independent, impartial evaluations of security equipment, systems, and processes at airports throughout the nation. Individual airports use the results to make informed decisions when deploying security technologies and procedures.

Through the POST (Performance and Operational System Testing) Program, Safe Skies conducts long-term evaluations of airport-owned equipment to track and document a device or system’s performance continuously over its life cycle.

Through PARAS (Program for Applied Research in Airport Security), Safe Skies provides a forum for addressing security problems identified by the aviation industry.

A Board of Directors and an Oversight Committee oversee Safe Skies’ policies and activities. The Board of Directors focuses on organizational structure and corporate development; the Oversight Committee approves PARAS projects and sets ASSIST Program priorities.

Funding for our programs is provided by the Federal Aviation Administration.
PROGRAM FOR APPLIED RESEARCH IN AIRPORT SECURITY
The Program for Applied Research in Airport Security (PARAS) is an industry-driven program that develops near-term practical solutions to security problems faced by airport operators. PARAS is managed by Safe Skies, funded by the Federal Aviation Administration, and modeled after the Airport Cooperative Research Program of the Transportation Research Board.

Problem Statements, which are descriptions of security problems or questions for which airports need guidance, form the basis of PARAS projects. Submitted Problem Statements are reviewed once yearly by the Safe Skies Oversight Committee, but can be submitted at any time.

A project panel is formed for each funded Problem Statement. Project panel members are selected by Safe Skies, and generally consist of airport professionals, industry consultants, technology providers, and members of academia—all with knowledge and experience specific to the project topic. The project panel develops a request of proposals based on the Problem Statement, selects a contractor, provides technical guidance and counsel throughout the project, and reviews project deliverables.

The results of PARAS projects are available to the industry at no charge. All deliverables are electronic, and most can be accessed directly at www.ss skies.org/paras.

PARAS PROGRAM OFFICER
Jessica Grizzle Safe Skies PARAS Program Manager

PARAS 0022 PROJECT PANEL
Jason Byers Dallas Fort Worth Int’l Airport
Frank Capello Broward County Aviation Department
Cory Chase Port of Portland Police Department
Tracy Fuller ACTS – Aviation Security, Inc.
Larry Mares San Francisco International Airport
Mo McGowan Partner Forces, LLC
Larry “Chip” Monts Jacksonville International Airport
Jay Shipp Dallas Fort Worth Int’l Airport
Zachary Shuman Woolpert
James F. Smith, Ph.D. Smith-Woolwine Assoc.
Thomas Wallace, III Memphis International Airport
Robert Wheeler Allied Universal
AUTHOR ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Research Team would like to thank the many airports, vendors, concessionaires, and the subject matter experts from federal, state, and local agencies who helped make this guidebook robust and useful to airports of all sizes. It is only through your support that Safe Skies is able to provide the aviation industry with valuable research on practical airport-related topics. Finally, the Research Team wants to thank the panel of volunteers who lent their expertise and time to ensuring the guidebook would be useful and applicable.
CONTENTS

HOW TO USE THIS GUIDEBOOK ix
PARAS ACRONYMS x
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, INITIALISMS, AND SYMBOLS xi

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport 1
1.2 Los Angeles International Airport 2
1.3 Additional Lessons Learned 3

SECTION 2: PREPARATION FOR AN INCIDENT 4
2.1 Planning Team 4
2.2 Evacuation Plan 4
2.3 Asset Identification 5
2.4 Staging Resources 5
2.5 Gate Closure 5
2.6 Communications 6
2.7 People With Access and Functional Needs 6
2.8 Training 7

SECTION 3: TRAINING AND AWARENESS 8
3.1 Onboarding and Recurring Training 8
3.2 Scope of Training 8
3.3 Conducting Training 9
3.4 Assessing the Training Program 9
3.5 Stakeholder Engagement 9
3.6 You Are the Help Until Help Arrives 10
3.7 What to Expect When Help Arrives 10
3.8 Behavior Messaging 10
3.9 Communications Training 11
3.10 Resources for Training and Guidance 11
    3.10.1 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation (HSEEP) Program 11
    3.10.2 National Incident Management System (NIMS) 12
    3.10.3 Unified Command System (UCS) 13
    3.10.4 Successful Strategies for Exercises and Drills 14
    3.10.5 Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drills 15
    3.10.6 Terminal Incident Response Plans 16

SECTION 4: EVACUATION 17
4.1 Controlled Evacuation 17
4.2 Uncontrolled Evacuation 18
4.3 Assembly Areas 18
4.4 Evacuee Support 19
4.5 Evacuation of the Entire Airport 19

SECTION 5: MANAGING VEHICULAR TRAFFIC 20
5.1 Vehicular Traffic Strategies 20
5.2 Managing Traffic Flow 20

SECTION 6: STAGING RESOURCES DURING AN INCIDENT 22
6.1 Command Staging 22
6.2 Responder Staging 22
6.3 Employee Staging 22
6.4 Equipment Staging 23
6.5 Media Staging 23

SECTION 7: RECOVERY 24
7.1 Recovery Planning 25
7.2 Zone Designations (Hot, Warm, and Cool) 26
7.3 Secure Locations for Victims and Bystanders 27
7.4 Biohazard Containment and Cleanup 27
7.5 Recovering Passenger Property 28
7.6 Reliever Airport Strategies 28
7.7 Resumption of Services 29
7.8 Additional Considerations 30

SECTION 8: COMMUNICATIONS 31
8.1 Communications Plans 31
8.2 Responders and Mutual Aid Partners 32
8.3 Airport Personnel 33
8.4 Passengers and Victims 33
8.5 Public Information Officer (PIO) 34
8.6 Media 34
8.7 The Community and the Public 35
8.8 Overcoming Communication Barriers 35
8.9 Social Media 36
8.10 Communications After an Incident 37

SECTION 9: MENTAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS 38
9.1 Psychological First Aid 38
9.1.1 General Procedural Recommendations 39
9.2 Extended Mental Health Recovery and Follow-Up Treatment 39
9.3 Community Recovery 40

SECTION 10: LEVERAGING EXISTING AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY 41
SECTION 11: LAYOUTS AND OTHER SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 42
  11.1 Identifying High-Risk Areas Around the Airport 42
  11.2 Safe Rooms 42
  11.3 Protective Devices 43
APPENDIX A: FIELD OPERATING GUIDE FOR RECOVERY AND RESTORATION A-1
APPENDIX B: RECOVERY PLANNING PROCESS AND PLAN CHECKLIST B-1
APPENDIX C: TRAINING AIDS C-1
APPENDIX D: MENTAL HEALTH RECOVERY CHECKLIST D-1
APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION E-1
END NOTES

TABLES & FIGURES
Figure 1. NIMS Training Levels 13
Figure 2. Unified Command Structure 13
Figure 3. Training-Capability Progression 14
Figure 4. FLL Shooting Response and Recovery Timeline 25
HOW TO USE THIS GUIDEBOOK

This guidebook is a complete source for information on strategies for mitigating and recovering from an active shooter incident.

To use this book most effectively, begin by reviewing the table of contents below. In doing so, you get an overview of the information in it, and you will be able to identify those sections that are especially relevant to your roles and responsibilities at the airport.

You can also use the information in this book to develop other materials for your airport’s needs, such as presentations for training, and information cards and other handouts with specific information for various roles within your organization.

In the appendices of the guidebook are several additional sources, including checklists for planning and reference material for more information.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACRP</td>
<td>Airport Cooperative Research Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>Airport Improvement Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOA</td>
<td>Air Operations Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFF</td>
<td>Aircraft Rescue &amp; Firefighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFR</td>
<td>Code of Federal Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COO</td>
<td>Chief Operating Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Federal Aviation Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Federal Security Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Internet Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for Proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROI</td>
<td>Return on Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Security Identification Display Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSI</td>
<td>Sensitive Security Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Transportation Security Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, INITIALISMS, AND SYMBOLS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-CERT</td>
<td>Airport Community Emergency Response Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Americans with Disabilities Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEP</td>
<td>Airport Emergency Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Crisis Communication Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERC</td>
<td>Crisis and Emergency Risk Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>Employee Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPT</td>
<td>Emergency Planning Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWG</td>
<td>Emergency Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLL</td>
<td>Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOG</td>
<td>Field Operating Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIPAA</td>
<td>Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSEEP</td>
<td>Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICMA</td>
<td>International City/County Management Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPAWS</td>
<td>Integrated Public Alert Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIS</td>
<td>Joint Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Multiagency Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSEL</td>
<td>Master Scenario Events List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFA</td>
<td>Psychological First Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public Information Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Rehearsal of Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIRP</td>
<td>Terminal Incident Response Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRM</td>
<td>Trauma Resiliency Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCS</td>
<td>Unified Command System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Wireless Priority Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

In recent years, two notable active shooter incidents have occurred at commercially operated airports in the United States. Each incident involved a lone gunman who entered the airport and began shooting at random targets. Several other occurrences of an active shooter have taken place in malls, movie theaters, schools, and places of worship, with similar random selection.

After each incident, the airport involved gathered important information that recounted the events that took place (e.g., valuable response and recovery activities, and interoperable coordination and communication strategies, etc.), and developed it into an After Action Report (AAR) and Improvement Plan. These documents are vital for airports to gain further insight, use lessons learned, and incorporate best practices to mitigate impacts, expedite the recovery of facilities, and restore operations.

Additionally, the Homeland Security Digital Library maintains a database of information that provides airports access to view and share AARs, document templates, innovative practices, and more. This section discusses historical incidents that offer lessons on how better to mitigate and recover from an active shooter incident.

1.1 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport

On January 6, 2017, five people were killed, six were wounded, and 30 sustained injuries during an active shooter attack inside the Terminal 2 baggage area at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL). Approximately 90 seconds after the first shot, the shooter surrendered to responding sheriff’s deputies. The shooter was later diagnosed with schizophrenia and sentenced to life in prison after pleading guilty on May 23, 2018.

The AAR highlights the following lessons learned to support industry preparedness. These lessons do not reflect all recommendations. For a full listing, refer to the Broward County Aviation Department Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport Active Shooter Incident and Post-Event Response January 6, 2017 After-Action Report, dated August 15, 2017.

- Incident Command System (ICS) training and exercises must be conducted periodically, for airport personnel to develop core competencies and coordinate with stakeholders.
- An active shooter response plan should be developed, or included in the Airport Emergency Plan (AEP), to “identify a concept of operations in an ICS context and address all areas of the airport including public areas and auxiliary properties, such as rental car facilities.”
- Developing continuing relationships with mutual-aid response partners is essential to a successful Unified Command. These relationships can be accomplished through collaborative planning and training, with a goal of developing an understanding of the resources and their assigned roles and responsibilities.

Additional lessons learned specific to the recovery phase include the following:
• Develop a plan to return personal property. Collecting, sorting, documenting, securing, and returning items left behind by individuals who evacuate during an active shooting is a daunting task, and it requires a large commitment of personnel and work hours.

• Family assistance centers are often established and run according to airline’s current guidance, which concentrates on circumstances involving an aircraft accident. Airport operators must be prepared to provide support and reunification for families.

• Conducting full-scale active-shooter emergency exercises can assist in identifying potential weaknesses that are unique to each airport. Once known, a strategic Improvement Plan can be developed to address each problem area.

• To speed immediate recovery and to improve long-term recovery, use a separate company trained in biohazard cleaning and disposal.

• To prepare to meet the basic needs of stranded travelers, it may be necessary to provide accommodations as portable restrooms and escorts to amenities. Snacks and water should also be provided.

• A stockpile of all necessary medical supplies, including bleeding kits should be established.

1.2 Los Angeles International Airport

On November 1, 2013, a TSA officer was killed, and one civilian and two other TSA officers were wounded in Terminal 3 of Los Angeles International Airport. The shooter pulled a rifle from his duffel bag and began shooting as he approached the security checkpoint. He continued firing as he moved further into the terminal. He was eventually wounded and apprehended by law enforcement. He pled guilty on September 6, 2016 and was sentenced to life plus sixty years.

The Los Angeles World Airports Active Shooter Incident and Resulting Airport Disruption – A Review of Response Operations indicates the following lessons learned from the incident:

• Emergency alert systems need to be evaluated and updated. Airport police and 911 notification systems need to be integrated.

• To facilitate a more rapid recovery, incident command basics need to be trained and understood at all levels of the airport.

• Emergency management policy must be clear and must identify key roles and their corresponding duties.

• Airport-wide mass notification systems are essential. They can be supplemented by local media and through social networking.

• Response plans must include basic needs for all displaced travelers, including those with special needs.

• Clear recovery objectives and transfer of incident command should be established in response plans, for an effective shift to the recovery phase and to ensure the most effective persons oversee the process.

Source: CNN
1.3 Additional Lessons Learned

The additional lessons learned in the list below should be considered by any airport as it plans for mitigating effects and recovering from active shooter incidents.

- Ensure that critical support staff, including tenants, can be quickly identified and have a way to access the airport, to support the recovery efforts and establish normal operations. Identify a parking location and access route for vehicles and pedestrian admittance.
- Communication is always identified as a challenge. Communication plans and verification of interagency operability is essential.
- The use of a Unified Command System is essential for an effective recovery. All personnel should be trained in basic National Incident Management System (NIMS) and ICS procedures.
- During an actual emergency, a gap exists between planned actions and what actually occurs during an event. It is important to capture these differences during the after action review, and then incorporate the changes into the emergency plan and training.
- The AEP, Continuity of Operations plan, Crisis Communication plans, etc. should be referred to and used during recovery.
SECTION 2: PREPARATION FOR AN INCIDENT

In addition to a vital airport emergency management program, preparation for active shooter incidents requires additional focus on the following key areas:

- Planning Team
- Evacuation Plan
- Asset Identification
- Staging Resources
- Gate Closure
- Communication
- People with Access and Functional Needs
- Training

2.1 Planning Team

Emergency planning is critical to an airport’s ability to recover from an active shooter incident. To be most effective, airports should form an Emergency Planning Team (EPT) tasked with developing, maintaining, and providing documentation for training and guidance as needed. An EPT should include representatives from the airport, tenants, airlines, other internal stakeholders, and supporting agencies. Each should have an equal voice in the development of emergency plans, training, and exercises. Responsibilities of the EPT may include:

- Conduct threat assessment as appropriate
- Prioritize planning, training, and exercise efforts
- Coordinate efforts as needed with other agencies
- Develop, integrate, and update all emergency plans and procedures
- Develop and update agreements with other agencies and mutual aid partners
- Provide training to the airport authority, stakeholders, and the community
- Develop a multi-year plan for training and exercises
- Design, coordinate, organize, and sponsor operations and exercises

2.2 Evacuation Plan

The ability to evacuate is a major function of responding to an active shooter incident, so airports must plan accordingly. Airports should consider developing an evacuation plan that covers the following items:

- Roles and responsibilities
- Controlled and uncontrolled evacuations
- Airport-wide evacuations
- Fire/HAZMAT incidents
- Security incidents
- Lockdown, lockout, and shelter-in-place
- Mass hysteria concerns
- Assembly areas
- Medical needs
- Individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional needs

2.3 Asset Identification

Identify available contractors and physical assets among internal and external stakeholders. Identify gaps, fill those gaps, and deconflict competing resources with other stakeholders. Assign responsibility for integrating each asset to internal command. Prepare agreements and procurement procedures necessary to call upon those assets when needed. Reassess the availability of assets at least annually.

2.4 Staging Resources

First Responders

Staging areas should be predetermined and codified in associated plans that provide contextual and visual aids. In addition, airports should determine applicability for segregating resources based upon mission (e.g., fire, law enforcement, medical transport, etc.) for large-scale responses. Small-scale responses can be consolidated into one area.

Other Responders

Equipment staging areas should be identified for non-first-responder teams and equipment that might be used for response and recovery from an active shooter incident. These teams include road crews, family reunification teams, mass care teams, tradesman and service personnel, contractors for personal belongings management, and others.

Personnel

Staging for airport personnel (i.e., operator, stakeholders, tenants, contractors, etc.) should be predetermined and documented accordingly. This staging area should account for shift changes and additional airport support, and should have means to transport employees as necessary. Tracking and accountability of these personnel is imperative.

Media

Media can be helpful or harmful to response and recovery efforts, depending on various factors. Identify Public Information Officers and include them in advanced planning, and in building relationships with local media. Media staging locations should be identified in advance and communicated to all local media. A defined media staging area away from the crime scene helps to ensure the media gets the information they need. It also provides for a single location from which to distribute all information.

2.5 Gate Closure

Gate closures are common, but traumatic incidents can complicate the process of deciding when to close gates. A gate closure plan can simplify operations and ensure those responsible are trained and well-rehearsed. An airport’s plan should indicate which gates might be affected. Identify the trigger points for
closing gates and opening gates, as well as the timing for gate control. The plan should also consider long term closures for such things as repainting and changes in interior design.

2.6 Communications

Based on an airport’s specific response and recovery plan, compose the necessary messages for each step or evolution of an incident. Include messaging for airport personnel, responders and their agencies, passengers and guests, stakeholders, media, politicians, and upper management. Identify the trigger points for messages and timing to deploy each message. Identify the method for posting each message via all available communication channels. The following aspects of communication should be considered:

- Gathering information
- Message responsibility
- What messaging needs to occur and when
- Communication channels available
  - Public safety radio
  - Changeable message boards
  - Public address systems
  - Text message systems
  - Websites
  - Commercial radio and TV
  - Social Media
- Integrating communications plans into training and exercise

See Section 8.1 for more information on Communications Plans.

2.7 People With Access and Functional Needs

Any plan for a response to an active shooter must consider the needs of individuals requiring assistance. Such needs must be addressed throughout the entire planning process. Applicable laws and regulations include but are not limited to:

- The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
- The Rehabilitation Act of 197
- EO 12196 “Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees” 1980
- EO 13347 “Individuals with Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness” 2004

Procedures for individuals with disabilities are frequently omitted from AEPs. The mantra of “Run, Hide, Fight” does not necessarily work for all ability levels, therefore, it is the airport personnel and first responders’ responsibility to provide for their safety and security. These concerns must be addressed when developing an AEP and included in training exercises and drills.
Consider the following best practices and recommendations when planning for individuals requiring assistance during an active shooter incident:

- Include training for airport personnel and responders in how best to integrate the needs of individuals with disabilities and special needs, in emergency planning, evacuation procedures, and crisis communication.
- For individuals requiring special assistance during an evacuation or shelter-in-place, define:
  - The assistance required
  - The available resources
  - Contact information for assistance
  - Accountability protocols
  - Any special equipment required
  - Evacuation routes
- Identify volunteers willing to assist people with disabilities or those needing assistance.
- Inform all first responders about what to expect and how to communicate effectively with the individuals.
- Emergency notifications should be made in a variety of formats, so that they are accessible to everyone. For example:
  - Visual and vibrating alerts for people who are hearing impaired
  - Alternative measures for people who are sight impaired
  - Cards with text and picture-based emergency messages and symbols
- Develop a “buddy system” for assisting people with disabilities to evacuate or conceal themselves.
- Consider how to use personal assistive devices (such as canes and crutches) as weapons if needed.
- Be sure to involve individuals with disabilities during planning.

2.8 Training

Training is the best way to prepare people to react quickly and effectively during an active shooter incident. To identify training strategies, first conduct a thorough review of the facilities and the needs and capabilities of the people involved. This assessment should include all available resources, program champions, airlines, vendors, stakeholders, first responders, and community, state, and federal resources. Once the needs are identified, conduct a survey of existing emergency plans and training programs to determine if suitable training already exists and can be better implemented and with greater frequency. If not, it may be necessary to design an entirely new training program.
SECTION 3: TRAINING AND AWARENESS

The first indication that an active shooter incident is occurring may be gunshots, a loud bang, some type of individual aberrant behavior, or mass panic. Ensure that all personnel understand the procedures for reporting these types of occurrences to security or law enforcement. Accurate and early reporting can be critical to quickly resolving and limiting the growth of an active shooter incident, and to allow for more efficient recovery.

Airport staff are a key line of defense for detecting a dangerous person or situation, as they are familiar with typical behaviors of passengers and other personnel. The more engaged employees are, the more capable they are of noticing and reporting suspicious behavior or circumstances. Implementing an awareness campaign and providing training builds a culture of alertness and prevention.

3.1 Onboarding and Recurring Training

Active shooter training should be required for all employees within thirty days of being hired, and it should be repeated periodically thereafter, biannually at a minimum. Regular training, exercises, and drills involving all employees and other stakeholders should be scheduled at least twice a year, with Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills involving first responders for each scheduled exercise.

Airports with significant funding resources may be able to run a standalone Airport Active Shooter Training program, offering extensive training open to the entire airport community.

3.2 Scope of Training

Implementation of annual or biannual training can be streamlined by providing it along with refresher training at the time of badge renewal. This will also establish a process for maintaining records. The information from the training program should also be continually reiterated to your internal workforce and all appropriate stakeholders through a variety of delivery methods, including email, video, posters, handouts, news bulletins, and meetings.

Each airport must assess the level of training required for individuals based on job title, responsibility, and required involvement in recovery from an active shooter incident. Although airports may use the same job titles, such as Operations Officer, the actual job function and level of authority can vary widely. The size of the airport often directly correlates with the number of operations personnel and type of departmental hierarchy.

While all badged employees require an overview of the AEP, the employees responsible for recovery and restoration of the airport need more hours of training on a higher level to develop the necessary knowledge and understanding of the AEP and any supplementary or standalone active shooter response and recovery plans. Topics for active shooter training should also include:

- How to recognize behavior indicators
- Reporting methods
- Evacuation considerations
• Employee roles and responsibilities
• Psychological effects during and after a life-threatening incident
• Situational awareness

Since the potential for mitigation of an incident often occurs outside of the airport, extending the reach of training to personnel such as ground transportation and parking staff is ideal, as they may be the first line of defense in identifying a behavior indicator.

3.3 Conducting Training

Each airport can determine the training method that best fits their employee population and resources. A classroom setting is highly effective, as it provides a forum for discussion of actual case studies, and for participants to identify ways the organization can prevent the incident. Other options include train-the-trainer, computer-based, virtual instruction, or self-study through a booklet or manual.

3.4 Assessing the Training Program

Evaluate the effectiveness of training and exercises by requesting feedback from participants and reviewing the program with stakeholders. Airports can evaluate individual sessions by administering a quiz before and after training, to learn how well participants retained the information. The quiz should focus on critical information related to active shooter incidents.

3.5 Stakeholder Engagement

Regardless of the size of an airport, stakeholder engagement provides a mechanism for exchanging information and promoting interaction with the airport operator. With the proper strategy, human resources, and funding, it can be a force multiplier during an emergency. *PARAS 0003 Enhancing Communication & Collaboration Among Airport Stakeholders* is a comprehensive guidebook for airport operators that should be reviewed in detail.

The benefits of stakeholder engagement vary based on circumstances, but it typically contributes to greater understanding, compliance, and collaboration among all relevant parties. Specifically, as newer technologies are implemented in airports, engagement is critical for their successful deployment and use.

Since airlines and terminal tenants are likely to be the first stakeholders affected by an active shooter incident, each should have a representative involved in development and annual review of the airport’s plan for active shooter response. Additionally, each airline and tenant has the responsibility to:

• Develop internal employee accountability plans
• Select locations to be used as safe rooms and meeting points
• Store resources for staff and customers who may be there for an extended amount of time
• Rotate and update these resources monthly
• Develop and regularly review a 24-hour contact list

Airport operators should work with the airlines and tenants to ensure that communication systems are compatible.
3.6 You Are the Help Until Help Arrives

Employee training should cover who to contact to report the shooting and what information to provide the dispatcher, such as the location and description of the shooter and weapons.

Employees may be the first personnel on the scene to help injured people, so training should also cover first aid. In an active shooter incident, one key to saving lives is stopping or controlling bleeding from wounds. Employee training should explain how to cover a wound and apply pressure. If trauma or Stop the Bleed® kits are placed across the airport campus, employees must be trained on their location and use.

3.7 What to Expect When Help Arrives

Basic training must help employees develop an understanding of what to expect and how to act when first responders arrive. Consider that plainclothes officers may already be on scene when the incident occurs, or they may be among the first to arrive. These officers could be from local, state, or federal agencies, and will be identified by badges or credentials. Uniformed officers will be easier to identify by their uniforms, body armor, helmets, and other tactical equipment, and they may be heavily armed. The first officers to arrive will focus on stopping the threat and may not initially stop to help the injured; securing the scene is paramount.

Key points to remember when law enforcement arrives are:

- Remain calm and attempt to calm others
- Follow officers’ orders
- Put down any items in your hands, raise your empty hands, spread your fingers, and always keep your hands visible
- Avoid making any quick movement toward the officers
- Avoid yelling, screaming, or pointing
- Do not ask officers for help or directions
- Evacuate as instructed by officers

Employees can expect emergency medical personnel to follow law enforcement officers almost immediately. These responders will treat and remove the injured persons and may call upon able-bodied individuals to assist them in removing the wounded.

Employees should be advised that, once they reach a safe location or an assembly point, they will likely be held in that area by law enforcement until the area has been checked for secondary threats and the situation is under control. Officers will identify and question all witnesses.

3.8 Behavior Messaging

As different public and private organizations develop active shooter programs, they sometimes adopt terminology that has evolved in their own organizations. Some of these organizations coin and

---

trademark phrases to prevent use by others. The resulting differences can cause confusion across the country and between responding organizations during an emergency. For this reason, standard terminology is important to preparedness.

The FBI and DHS active shooter training program discusses being prepared to respond to a situation with three options: RUN, HIDE, FIGHT®. Decision-making tools such as this are useful for personnel and citizens caught in an incident. Once people recognize an incident is unfolding, they naturally engage in a process of observe-orient-decide-act (OODA loop). In this process, individuals search for options to improve their situation. In most cases, active shooter responses can be improved with better informed and quicker reactions by airport personnel and passengers.

### 3.9 Communications Training

After a communication plan has been revised to include active shooter incidents, the plan must be trained. Communications plan training can be segmented into three categories.

- **Initial Training**: Delivered in a classroom setting, initial training introduces new personnel and stakeholders to the basics of an existing communications plan. It also includes information regarding the types of communications equipment available, terminology, familiarization with the airport and designated locations, aircraft operations, weather procedures, and other irregular operations.

- **Recurring Training**: Recurring training refreshes existing knowledge, and introduces plan revisions, lessons learned, and new procedures.

- **Event-Specific Training**: As a standalone, or part of the airport’s training and exercise program, event-specific training can include triennial exercises, irregular operations, active shooter response, etc.

Communication Plans are discussed in detail in Section 8. Additional information can be found in the Safe Skies report titled *PARAS 0003: Enhancing Communication and Collaboration Among Airport Stakeholders*.

### 3.10 Resources for Training and Guidance

This section discusses numerous resources that are available to develop and administer training and guidance for active shooter training.

#### 3.10.1 Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation (HSEEP) Program

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) provides a set of guiding principles for developing exercises, as well as a common approach to managing exercise programs, including design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.
Using HSEEP, airports can develop, execute, and evaluate exercises that address established preparedness priorities. These priorities are informed by risk and capability assessments, findings and corrective actions from previous incidents, and external requirements like regulations and grant guidance. They also guide the overall direction of an exercise program. Individual exercises are anchored to a common set of priorities or objectives, and build toward an increasing level of complexity. Accordingly, these priorities guide the design and development of individual exercises, as airports identify exercise objectives and align them to capabilities for evaluation during the exercise.

By formally evaluating training exercises, airports can assess whether the exercises meet objectives and capabilities of the airport. Airports can document their strengths, areas for improvement, capability, and corrective actions in an AAR or Improvement Plan. Airports can then take the necessary corrective actions needed to improve plans, build and sustain capabilities, and maintain readiness.

HSEEP exercise and evaluation principles are flexible, scalable, and adaptable. They may be used by stakeholders in all mission areas, including prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Using HSEEP provides a consistent approach to exercises and measuring progress toward building, delivering, and sustaining the organization’s capabilities.

The HSEEP program incorporates lessons learned and best practices from all communities. It also draws on current policies and plans that support training, technology systems, tools, and technical assistance. Exercise practitioners are encouraged to apply and adapt HSEEP principles to meet their specific needs.

While the concept and purpose of HSEEP are simple, the development and execution of the program requires training and expertise. Certified HSEEP practitioners can assist in developing airport programs. Assistance from these professionals can be attained from your local emergency management office, state emergency management, or from private companies. HSEEP resource materials are also available on the FEMA website at https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/exercises/hseep.

### 3.10.2 National Incident Management System (NIMS) iii

The NIMS provides guidance on how to manage the many agencies and responsibilities involved in active shooter incident prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery. NIMS guides all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work together by providing stakeholders with shared vocabulary, systems, and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities required of them in an incident.

One component of NIMS is the ICS, which is a system for organizing stakeholders and personnel into a cohesive effort. Another component is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), an offsite organization of stakeholders designed to support the incident command with a flow of resources and information. Supporting the EOC is the Multiagency Coordination (MAC) Group. The MAC is similar to the EOC, but it is generally responsible for less immediate resources such as state and federal support.

Figure 1 illustrates the training that is appropriate for responders at each operational level.
3.10.3 Unified Command System (UCS)

FEMA defines a Unified Command System (UCS) as “an application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the UCS, often the senior person from agencies and/or disciplines participating in the incident, to establish a common set of objectives and strategies and develop a single Incident Action Plan.” In an airport environment consisting of internal and external stakeholders, local government support, and first responders, a UCS may be the best option to maintain situational awareness and a common operating picture.

The UCS, like the ICS, has a shared responsibility among all agency representatives to ensure that all activities are carried out safely and effectively. The UCS can be implemented at the Incident Command Post, EOC, or a combination of both. Figure 2 shows the relationships of the roles that make up the Unified Command. See Section 8.5 for more information on the role of the Public Information Officer (PIO).
3.10.4 Successful Strategies for Exercises and Drills

Active shooter incidents vary in levels of severity, complexity, timing, location, etc. Therefore, practicing different scenarios is vital to the preparedness effort for all airport personnel, mutual aid partners, and first responders. By rehearsing the scenarios of mitigation, response, and recovery, airports can better work towards saving lives, while also ensuring a more efficient recovery time. Airports can also better preserve the crime scene, establish access to and from the airport, and prepare the communications needed to promote safety and deliver important updates.

An HSEEP-compliant program directs airports in developing, conducting, and assessing the effectiveness of exercises. Once a plan is developed, the next step is to train those with a role for carrying out specific actions during response and recovery. The HSEEP model provides a progressive approach that enables responders to build upon an initial understanding of responsibilities as their skills develop. This progression leads to more complex types of exercise that can be more effective overall.

Workshops and seminars help to develop a plan to provide applicable training. Tabletop exercises are a cost-effective way an airport can provide for facilitated discussion, through scenarios that ensure no gaps exist in the plans. During a tabletop, the key players who have emergency response roles within the airport get together and discuss a simulated emergency situation. Those involved can rehearse their roles, ask questions, and identify potential problems in a calm and non-threatening environment. A tabletop can be conducted by a department or involve mutual-aid responders. At a minimum, a scenario must be provided, and additional forms, actor cards, and supplemental information can be injected to broaden the scope of the tabletop.

Exercise drills enable responders to rehearse a specific action that may need to be further refined or better understood. Functional exercises allow for a more realistic application of the plan without acquiring or moving resources. Finally, full-scale exercises provide for a true-to-life practice environment in which all those with responsibilities for carrying out the plan perform the activities defined. Figure 3 illustrates various types of training and the progression of capability from one to the next.

An inject—a basic component of HSEEP—is a surprise or change in a scenario that interrupts a normal plan or process, such as the loss of key personnel or a resource during the incident. Using injects helps to rehearse a contingency plan or uncover a previously unknown condition. HSEEP’s Master Scenario...
Events List (MSEL) is a list of injects for an exercise that provides the timeline, location, intended player, core capability, and expected response for each specific inject.

Injects are specific to each organization’s unique active shooter recovery plan and to the core training objectives within that plan. A well prepared MSEL, specific to the airport’s plan, has great value to the HSEEP process, but a poorly prepared MSEL can have no benefit and may even harm the HSEEP process. Thus, each MSEL should be developed by the HSEEP planning team for your airport.

The following items are some common categories for injects:

- Loss of personnel, equipment, or media staging area
- Loss of planned traffic ingress or egress
- Loss of cellular telephone system
- Key personnel reporting without proper credentials or badges
- Loss of key player (e.g., Incident Commander, Operations Manager, Police Chief, Fire Chief, PIO, or the Policy Group)
- Support or replacement staffing for traumatized personnel
- Missing child or person (i.e., unaccounted for passengers and personnel)
- Difficulty obtaining access to passenger manifests
- Concessions not reopening
- Loss of emergency baggage sort facility

After completing any exercise, be sure to capture the best practices and lessons learned by developing an AAR and Improvement Plan. AARs provide a complete breakdown of the exercise and its results. The Improvement Plan then captures any areas for improvement or gaps in capabilities, and provides a manageable process for planners and other applicable personnel to address in a systematic and timely fashion.

Checklists for the design and conduct of tabletop drills and exercises are included in Appendix C.

3.10.5 Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) Drills

An ROC drill may be used to further instill understanding of concepts, roles, and responsibilities. It is a quick walk-through of a response plan, involving the stakeholders and first responders, to allow the participants to visualize their actions and how they should respond in various operational situations. This process alleviates confusion about how the plan should be implemented. The drill may mitigate any potential blue-on-blue conflicts, where plainclothes officers are mistaken for suspects, and could improve the airport’s emergency plan. Potential resolutions to blue-on-blue conflicts can include training on specific techniques for presenting a badge when in plain clothing, or using off-duty jackets with pull-down Police placards. Participants should include the principal employees and those one and two levels below, as well as any others with critical roles. An ROC drill helps synchronize when and where responders will perform their duties.

At a minimum, a five-minute ROC drill should address the following elements:

- Scope of response, incident objectives, and core capabilities of stakeholders
- Participant roles and responsibilities
• Safety issues, emergency codes and phrases, safety controller responsibilities, prohibited activities, and weapons policies
• Logistics
• Security of and access to the incident site
• Communications (e.g., radio frequencies or channels used)
• The effects of duration, date, and time on an incident
• Maps and directions

3.10.6 Terminal Incident Response Plans
For a plan to be successful, it must be trained and tested. Employees and tenants need to be aware of their roles and responsibilities specific to an active shooter. Terminal Incident Response Plans (TIRP) are developed to enhance preparedness for terminal evacuations, sheltering in place, and repopulation for incidents that disrupt normal terminal operations. The ACRP’s TIRP tool can be used by an airport to develop customized plans appropriate for responding to an active shooter incident. More in-depth guidance, including a sample TIRP and the TIRP tool, are found in *ACRP Report 112: Airport Terminal Incident Response Planning.*
SECTION 4: EVACUATION

Evacuations are a major component of an active shooter incident, and airports should plan accordingly. Airports should consider developing an evacuation plan that covers the following items:

- Terminal and facility evacuations
- Controlled vs. uncontrolled
- Airport-wide evacuations
- Fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and hazmat vs. security
- Lockdown, lockout, and shelter-in-place
- Mass hysteria concerns and strategies
- Assembly areas
- Medical and other humanitarian needs
- Predetermined roles and responsibilities
- Weather
- Traffic flow and best routes

4.1 Controlled Evacuation

A controlled evacuation typically occurs in response to hazardous or potentially hazardous conditions that are not recognized by the occupants of the airport as immediately life threatening, but they require an evacuation to ensure safety and security. Examples of this type of evacuation are bomb threats, security breaches, suspected IEDs, small fires, gas leaks, and hazardous chemical spills.

During controlled evacuations, airport employees, technologies, and systems are in place to guide evacuees out of a terminal or facility to assemble in a predetermined gathering area or assembly area. These areas are typically located far away from the building and in a secure location, so as to not interfere with aircraft and their movement, or vehicular traffic. During a controlled evacuation, less disruption occurs, as security and operational activities are maintained more effectively. Generally, a controlled evacuation is isolated to a single facility or terminal. However, for airports with only one terminal, this creates a substantial impact to operations. Controlled evacuations are coordinated by the Incident Commander or by Unified Command, who determine which areas to evacuate, the perimeter of the evacuated area, and the assembly location.

Normal emergency protocols are followed to alert occupants that a specific area is being evacuated. These protocols should instruct airport personnel to proceed to predetermined positions, to initiate the evacuation and assist with moving people to the assembly area. Airport personnel then remain in the assembly area to ensure that no one leaves and perpetrators do not enter, and to await further instructions.
Airport operators, tenants, and stakeholders should regularly train employees and conduct drills to ensure airport personnel can perform their responsibilities effectively and efficiently. Some key planning components to help aid in evacuation practices consist of:

- Brainstorm conditions under which a controlled evacuation would be necessary.
- Establish a clear chain of command and designate personnel authorized to order an evacuation or shutdown, as well as an alternate. Designation of an evacuation warden to assist others and account for personnel may also aid in ensuring that the facility is clear of any persons.
- Develop specific evacuation procedures, including routes and exits. Post these procedures where they are easily accessible to all employees.
- Establish procedures for assisting people with disabilities and access and functional needs, and those with language barriers.
- Designate which operations or employee activities may continue during an evacuation versus those that will shut down. Employees who do not immediately evacuate must be trained to recognize when and how they should evacuate themselves.
- Develop a system for accounting for all personnel following an evacuation.
- Identify services that may be needed by both employees and passengers during prolonged evacuations.

### 4.2 Uncontrolled Evacuation

Uncontrolled evacuations occur when people seek to escape an immediate life-threatening situation, such as an active shooter, by using any exit available. When individuals are escaping for survival, concerns for maintaining Secured or Sterile Areas—such as airside ramps, taxiways and runways—are likely to be disregarded. These areas can be assumed to be overrun by unsecured people escaping danger.

Uncontrolled evacuations most often occur because of the immediacy and severity of the incident, for which no evacuation announcement is made. An uncontrolled evacuation increases the likelihood of injury and property damage due to people panicking and fleeing in any direction, and through any passageway or exit, to seek safety. All airport personnel must understand that these types of evacuations will present challenges that do not exist with controlled evacuations, and should be prepared to identify, manage, and recover from them in order to maintain the safety of the passengers and fellow workers.

To aid in evacuations, many airports may have command centers to monitor data from sensors, surveillance devices, and other applicable technologies. The airport’s fire alarm, security, and other systems may be used to notify passengers and personnel of an emergency. These systems can display messages on departure/arrival and baggage screens, and, in some cases, other screens such as terminal televisions and advertising screens. Also, public address systems can broadcast pre-recorded or real-time (ad hoc) messages, to provide passengers with instructions. Airports serving international travelers should consider broadcasting messages in multiple languages. Programmable roadway signage and variable message signs can additionally be used for information sharing across the airport campus to alert passengers and employees of an ongoing incident.

### 4.3 Assembly Areas

Assembly areas are useful in recovery operations. Airports can designate these areas for gathering evacuees inside and outside of the Secured Area. When determining assembly areas, airport operations,
applicable tenants and stakeholders, and first responders should be included in order to ensure the locations are free from danger, do not impede or interfere with aircraft/vehicle movement, and are in compliance with local, state, and federal regulations.

Easy-to-read signs should be posted or marked to provide directions to these areas. Planning and training for airport employees and responders should include maps of these locations. The maps should also have instructions on how to direct passengers during and after an evacuation. One option may be to store maps electronically so they may be easily accessed and provided to responders who are unfamiliar with the areas or facilities. This practice can aid in clearing locations and dispatching personnel to the assembly areas to provide security or emergency assistance.

Additionally, evacuation instruction cards can be included with the employees’ ID badges for quick reference. Depending on design and complexity, these cards can also include a map of assembly area(s), to further assist airport employees. Once inside a safe assembly area, airport employees, tenants, and passengers should remain and await further instruction from the incident commander or their designee. These areas should be secured and protected by the police, security, or other assigned airport personnel.

### 4.4 Evacuee Support

For situations where passengers and employees may be gathered for extended periods of time, basic and medical services may need to be addressed. Restroom accessibility, water, and potentially snacks should be considered, and logistics should be determined for how and where they will be provided.

Additionally, some evacuees may have medical needs such as pregnancy, those that require diabetic insulin, and other situations that could inhibit a person’s safety. Planning and communication for these types of situations should be discussed and coordinated through the incident commander or designee to ensure that life safety can be maintained.

### 4.5 Evacuation of the Entire Airport

In some cases, a complete evacuation of the entire airport might allow for quicker transition from initial response to the recovery phase. If this occurs, depending on the airport, it might create different challenges from that of a partial evacuation.

Airports should properly plan for all logistics in the safe movement of persons from the airport property to a separate, predetermined location. In determining a location, account for basic human needs and any medical concerns that may arise. Where proper security, medical and psychological support and coordination is needed, airport operators should consider using nonprofit organizations such as the American Red Cross, Salvation Army, etc. to aid in the support efforts.
SECTION 5: MANAGING VEHICULAR TRAFFIC

During an active shooter incident, gridlock can occur at the airport and well beyond due to a convergence of vehicles flowing into and out of the airport. Traffic lights left on normal timing, and drivers stopping to ask questions, can also add to congestion.

Diverting traffic through uneven terrain or gravel, using parking garages and other uncommon traffic routes, and improperly marked and managed checkpoints can all also slow traffic and contribute to confusion.

Responders may also increase congestion and access challenges by blocking entries and exits, and loading and unloading zones for personnel and equipment. Because entry and exit locations are vital to response and recovery, planning efforts must eliminate or reduce traffic issues that inhibit access for responders and delivery of resources. With proper planning, airports have many opportunities to address challenges in traffic and staging areas.

5.1 Vehicular Traffic Strategies

According to FEMA’s National Incident Support Manual (Feb 2011), agencies should develop policies and plans for coordinating traffic into and out of the airport and staging areas. Access for first responders and medical transport should be a high priority and airport operators should partner with law enforcement and other agencies to develop plans for dedicated vehicle routes. The plans should ensure traffic lanes and pre-determined staffing areas are clearly identified for emergencies. Training and exercises for these locations should be conducted to further prepare responders.

Traffic engineers, law enforcement, and airport partners should assess the existing network of airport roadways for chokepoints and possibilities for gridlock, which could occur during an emergency. They should identify alternate routes or reverse-flow traffic patterns and, if necessary, consider constructing by-pass service roads where feasible.

During emergencies, vehicular traffic controls are critical for ensuring adequate movement and access to all areas of the facility. They are particularly important for first responders and the fast and effective delivery of equipment and personnel. Once an incident location has been declared safe by law enforcement, the established controls aid the evacuation of passengers and airport employees.

5.2 Managing Traffic Flow

Effective traffic management is accomplished by training traffic control officers who can assist law enforcement. They can take lead roles when circumstances dictate or when deemed necessary by the Incident Commander. Proper communication and dispatch practices provide additional aid. Traffic control practices should include variable message signs, road closures, airport closures, and alternate routes. Messaging may also need to be done face-to-face as drivers often stop to ask questions.

Traffic control officers should evaluate all roadway and traffic flow systems. They should also identify where closures or modifications can be made, to keep traffic flowing while working to clear terminals and other affected areas.
If possible, take steps to prevent unnecessary traffic through the scene. Use physical barriers where checkpoints are not established. When planning for access controls to stop inbound traffic, consider issuing airport emergency badges to allow access to personnel who have a need to be on scene.

Conduct training exercises during high flow times. The exercises will help to develop an understanding of dispatching times and equipment availability. They can also help determine any ad hoc messaging that might be needed. Dispatching emergency resources and engaging in roadway-recovery procedures help to facilitate a quick return to normal traffic patterns.

Another asset in the process is the Department of Transportation (DOT). The DOT can work with airport operators and law enforcement on developing and enacting plans to adjust traffic lights. Messages displayed on roadway signs can indicate the impact of the current situation, as well as checkpoint locations and alternate routes. DOT can partner with other agencies to acquire additional resources that may be needed.
SECTION 6: STAGING RESOURCES DURING AN INCIDENT

Having staging areas is common practice at many airports, especially in preparation for an emergency. This practice helps to ensure that responding agencies know where to report and wait for instructions. The following types of staging areas are needed during emergencies:

- Command staging
- Responder staging
- Employee staging
- Equipment staging
- Media staging

In addition, airport operators and their mutual aid partners may need to account for:

- Transportation of staff
- Security
- Escorts between staging areas and the response site

A well-defined process for dispatching resources from the staging areas is encouraged. Requiring signing in and out better ensures accountability for personnel and resources.

6.1 Command Staging

Incident command establishes the incident command post as near to the incident as safety permits. The location may be any location deemed appropriate by the incident command, such as in the middle of a parking lot or in the terminal. The incident command post can be moved several times throughout an incident and recovery.

6.2 Responder Staging

Responder staging areas should be well defined and codified in associated plans, along with contextual and visual aids. Staging procedures should consider multiple points of entry and exit, potentially confusing structural layouts, and radio dead spots.

Airports should determine the applicability for segregating resources based upon mission (e.g., fire, law enforcement, medical transport, etc.) They should also consider large-scale responses. Smaller airports can consolidate responder staging if they do not have land or roadway availability.

6.3 Employee Staging

A designated employee staging area allows for a higher level of accountability, whether it is established before the incident or identified during the initial response. Managing shift changes reduces the risk to responders and prepares for a controlled transition to the recovery stage.

Staging for airport employees, as well as other stakeholders including tenants and contractors, should be clearly defined and documented. This staging area should account for shift changes and additional airport support, and it should have the means to transport employees to and from the incident area. Employees also benefit from briefings and debriefings, shift-change checklists or other applicable materials, as well as emergency medical personnel and mental health professionals on location.
6.4 Equipment Staging

Equipment staging areas should be identified for any non-responder equipment that is to be used during an active shooter incident. This equipment may include portable lavatory systems, light banks, barriers, heavy equipment, generators, and mobile message signs.

6.5 Media Staging

Advanced planning and building relationships with local media are important for maintaining control of the media response during an emergency. Provide a defined media staging area away from the incident scene and confine all media personnel to a single location. In this way, they can receive a timely distribution of accurate information from the airport operator’s spokesperson.

When selecting a media staging area, the location should be conducive to providing live coverage that is advantageous to both the airport and the media. The area should be large enough to accommodate several local and national agencies. It should be easily accessible but far enough away from any potential danger, and it should not affect response and recovery activities.

Source: Adobe Stock Images
SECTION 7: RECOVERY

The recovery phase following an incident is the most time-consuming phase. Recovery can quickly exhaust airport resources. Each airport must evaluate their capabilities and consider potential resources that could be provided by stakeholders, such as the airlines and other tenants, to assist in recovery efforts. Airports can also consider airport-to-airport mutual aid, Airport Community Emergency Response Teams (A-CERT), Emergency Working Groups (EWG), and other local volunteer agencies to fill personnel gaps, but feasibility depends on local availability and opportunity to provide sufficient training.

The full impact of the active shooter attack must be evaluated. Each situation is unique and has different circumstances that correlate with the length of the recovery phase. An incident with a single victim and few employees affected will have a shorter recovery time and will cause less psychological damage than an incident with many lives lost and dozens injured.

Figure 4—a timeline of events from the FLL shooting in 2017—illustrates that recovery from an incident can take several days.
7.1 Recovery Planning

A detailed recovery plan aids in safely and expeditiously resuming services. The plan should account for short-term and long-term recovery functions. The recovery plan should address the following:

- Mutual aid agreements that outline recovery functions and support in accordance with NIMS
- A whole-community approach to training and developing exercises, planning, policy making, and procedure development
- Definitions for how each stakeholder will support the recovery efforts
Mutual aid agreements can indicate where the airport operator, tenants, and stakeholders do not have the resources (including personnel) to deliver essential services. Agreements should clearly define the following items:

- Key terms used in the agreement
- Roles and responsibilities of individual parties
- Procedures for requesting and providing assistance
- Procedures, authorities, and rules for payment, reimbursement, and allocation of costs
- Notification procedures
- Protocols for interoperable communications
- Relationships with other agreements among jurisdictions
- Workers’ compensation requirements
- Treatment of liability and immunity
- Recognition of qualifications, licensure, and certifications
- Sharing agreements, as required
- Termination clause

Decision points should be defined by the airport operator and mutual aid partners to help expedite recovery processes following an active shooter incident. These points should reflect how the airport makes key decisions based on established policies and procedures, emergency response plans, and mutual aid agreements. For active shooter incidents, these predetermined decision points may vary between airports and their respective stakeholders and tenants.

### 7.2 Zone Designations (Hot, Warm, and Cool)

A hot zone is the area containing a known hazard or other threat to life. These zones include any uncontrolled area where an active shooter might directly engage people. The area remains a hot zone until it has been secured by law enforcement and declared to pose no immediate threat.

After an incident is under control, the area becomes a crime scene. All responders, including fire, EMS, medical personnel, and key airport staff must minimize the removal or disposal of anything that can be used during an investigation, including the clothing of the injured and any other items located in this zone. If the circumstances allow, emergency personnel should seek the guidance of law enforcement before removing any persons (injured or deceased). If this is not possible without putting lives at risk, personnel should report the original positions to investigators. Even in open access crime scenes, personnel should consult with law enforcement before entering or removing items.

The number of personnel entering a crime scene must be kept to the minimum necessary. They should use the same route for entry and exit, avoiding obvious items of evidence (e.g., shell casings, pools of blood, blood smears, broken glass, weapons, etc.) Medical waste, except for sharp objects, should be
placed in approved containers left at the scene. Airport operators should also consult with investigators on strategies and options for reducing the crime scene footprint without hindering the investigation.

A warm zone is an area where law enforcement has either cleared or isolated a threat, and the ongoing risk is minimal or has been mitigated. This area may be considered clear without being secure. If a crime scene includes areas with specialized medical equipment, medications, or hazardous materials, these areas should be limited to trained personnel. Airport personnel may be excluded from these areas, unless approved or escorted by law enforcement.

Airport operators may begin strategizing measures to establish barriers that prevent the public from entering the area. Expanding or reducing the area of the response might include expanding or reducing the size of the warm zone, or moving triage and transport areas away from passenger areas. All of these changes depend upon the evolving response to the incident.

A cold zone is an area where there is little or no threat. It may include the outside of the building, or other areas secured by law enforcement. Airport operators may resume operations here as necessary and determine if cold zones are feasible for crowd management, media staging, and other mission-essential functions. Airport staff should remain vigilant and report any additional suspicious activity to their respective supervisor or law enforcement.

### 7.3 Secure Locations for Victims and Bystanders

Victims, witnesses, and bystanders should be directed to secure locations. Bystanders who are not victims or witnesses should be kept separate from others, if possible, to avoid interference with law enforcement investigations or medical assistance.

When selecting secure locations, airport operators should consider areas such as corporate hangars, cargo ramps, general aviation facilities, and other locations with restrooms, refreshments, temperature-controlled areas, and interview rooms.

### 7.4 Biohazard Containment and Cleanup

Following an active shooter incident, airports must consider biohazard cleanup and disposal. Many airports do not have internal resources capable of addressing this process, so they will require professional assistance from specialist companies. Airport operators should consider using temporary walls or partitions to isolate affected areas, shielding the traveling public from the incident site.

Source: Adobe Stock Images
7.5 Recovering Passenger Property

Different policies may exist at different airports for managing bags and personal items following a shooting. Some airports may rely on airlines, while others can use outside vendors for these recovery functions. Regardless of strategy, the airport operator must manage collecting, tracking, and returning personal effects.

Beyond baggage, other items such as wallets, purses, cell phones, laptops, service animals, and pets may be left by fleeing passengers, patrons, and employees. Airports should determine the best approach for returning property, by identifying stakeholders responsible for the procedures and codifying them in a relative plan. Training and conducting exercises of this process is recommended. Some key aspects to plan for are:

- **Documentation**
  - Item locations
  - Item descriptions, to include anything that would make it unique
  - How and by whom the items were retrieved
  - Any communications with the owner of the items
  - Who released the items?
  - The organization’s document retention policies, including the chain-of-custody forms

- **Procedure for persons to contact** the airport operator, vendor, or airlines that are managing the reclamation of items. Post contact information, submission form, etc. on all applicable media, including web portals.

- **Methods for delivering items to owners**
  - After the FLL incident, cargo operators (FedEx and UPS) delivered items to persons outside the immediate area, and developed a team of internal personnel to deliver items to local passengers.
  - The delivery process should be predetermined and documented. All personnel involved should be trained on the process.

7.6 Reliever Airport Strategies

During response and recovery, resources can be exhausted beyond the local airport’s capability. Diversion of inbound fights is initially handled by the FAA and local air traffic control. During extended periods of recovery, airlines may change routes to utilize other airports that are close by, or modify flight schedules to work out of limited gate space.

If a lack of personnel becomes an issue for regular airport operations, mutual aid agreements with other airports may offer a potential solution, by providing uniquely qualified and experienced personnel and equipment. A-CERTs or EWGs can also provide a pool of resources to potentially fill gaps in personnel. Airport operators should consider developing these relationships and pre-train members from local resources for different functional areas.
7.7 Resumption of Services

Before resuming services and repopulating areas, various procedures may be required depending upon the degree of the loss of life and damage to property. These procedures include but are not limited to the following:

- Engineering assessments
- Restoration of utilities
- Clearance of debris
- Cleanup of biohazards
- Trash removal

Terminals and the airfield must be inspected, and the results documented, to ensure facilities are safe for the public. The process of inspecting the terminal can be detailed and lengthy. All available resources should be used to support the airport operator, including any K9 units and TSA or Customs and Border Protection personnel. All janitorial and repair services should be completed prior to restoring any operations. All exits and sterile area access doors must be checked and tested secure. The airport operator must also verify that all internal systems, such as access control and inline baggage systems, are functioning. When the systems check is complete, the airport operator must confirm that all stakeholders have the necessary staffing levels to support resuming operations.

Repopulating the Sterile Area is a complex process that requires a Unified Command and is typically coordinated by the EOC. Be sure to synchronize the efforts of law enforcement and airport operations with other airport stakeholders. Repopulating in phases helps ensure that no steps are omitted in the process of returning to normal operations.

Reactivating the security screening checkpoints should be coordinated with the FSD or an authorized designee. If proper security levels were not maintained during the incident, or terminals were cleared of all persons as part of the inspection process, then passengers and employees must be rescreened prior to reentering the Sterile Area. A priority-based screening process should be implemented to ensure that workers (at concessions, for airlines, and other tenants) and flight crews are screened before passengers.

If it is not possible to fully repopulate an area, a partial repopulation may allow some operational activity to resume. Any areas affected by an incident can be blocked from access by the public. Common access gates and equipment across the airport allow for airlines to share the same gates, permitting temporary relocation to resume flight operations more readily.

In larger airports with multiple terminals, it is critical that emergency responders know where they are being directed to go. Identifying specific sectors during advanced planning can reduce the duration of the recovery phase. The EOC, Incident Commander, or Unified Command can then assign a coordinator for each sector, to manage the reactivation of systems and the physical reentry process. Grid maps, signs, and symbols placed at main access points can indicate the status of each sector with respect to the recovery process.
7.8 Additional Considerations

TENANTS
Prior to resuming operations, each tenant must be allowed to inspect its leased space and report any damage. Not all vendors and concessioners need to recommence full operations before resuming air carrier operations. Tenants should inform the airport operator of their status and the service level they can provide. The airport operator should determine a sufficient level of services to support travelers.

FLIGHT OPERATIONS
Flight operations should be coordinated with the airport operator, to ensure all facilities can accommodate departing and arriving flights.

Air Traffic Control should be notified of the anticipated time to return to operations.

GROUND OPERATIONS
Traffic plans should define vehicle movement patterns and evacuation routes.

Batteries may drain in vehicles left with emergency lighting in operation. Vehicles that cannot be started may need to be towed to clear terminal roadways; consider staging tow trucks on standby off site.

Roadway checkpoints located too close to airport facilities can cause excessive congestion that may impact facility operations.

Before resuming airline services, ground transportation services should be in place and ready to accommodate passengers.

ROADWAYS
Establish strategic checkpoints to allow vehicles to exit main roadways, to prevent congestion and allow access for emergency responders and other transportation.

Demobilization of response vehicles and checkpoints should be coordinated with the Incident Command Post and the airport EOC.

PARKING AND GARAGES
Parking garage staff should be trained to manage mass exodus and vehicle detainment for investigatory purposes immediately following an active shooter incident.

Airports should define other measures as needed to expedite vehicle exiting.

CURBSIDE, DROP OFF, AND PICK UP
As with most security incidents, additional law enforcement officers or traffic coordinators may be useful or necessary during periods of heightened alert after the incident.

Expectations for customer service should be acknowledged while also maintaining vigilance for secondary or follow-on incident(s).
SECTION 8: COMMUNICATIONS

8.1 Communications Plans

Communicating during an emergency is always a challenge, despite the best efforts of trained professionals. Following a predetermined communication plan, written in plain language, is critical for an effective response. Communication plans and exercises should be ongoing elements in education and training.

Communications plans support the incident commander and the stakeholders. When preparing plans, the public information team must consider the many requirements of each. Incident personnel and their organizations should understand the standard types of communication: strategic, tactical, support, and public. PARAS 0003: Enhancing Communication and Collaboration Among Airport Stakeholders discusses these types of communication and details considerations for preparing a communications plan, such as building relationships, building the plan and documentation requirements, and establishing and revising policies and procedures.

CRISIS AND EMERGENCY RISK COMMUNICATIONS (CERC) PLAN

The airport’s CERC plan should address how the airport operator, tenants, stakeholders, and other mutual aid partners communicate during and after an incident. A CERC plan helps responders to know:

- Who they are to communicate with (i.e., the flow of communication)
- What technologies are available
- How to maintain contact number lists that are accurate and up to date
- Who has the authority to develop and approve public messages
- Any special codes and terms to be used by those responding but kept secluded from the public
- How the airport incorporates the Joint Information System (JIS)

The JIS defines a process to avoid repetitive or conflicting information. A Joint Information Center (JIC) is established at a location where applicable PIOs, or their designees, produce messages. Any facility can serve as a JIC, as long as it has the technology to support communications and other related items and functions.

AEP AND CRISIS COMMUNICATION PLAN (CCP)

When an incident closes an airport, it affects the National Airspace System and any organizations involved in support of air transport. An emergency communications plan is required for all airports with commercial service, as part of their AEP, to address response capabilities and interoperability. However, many communication sections of AEPs do not address the intense need for real-time information. This need can come from media, passengers, employees, surrounding communities, and other stakeholders affected by an incident. To address this need, airports must develop a CCP for use during response and recovery. An airport CCP is necessary to identify the key contacts and communication tools used by the PIO in responding to emergencies. It provides a guideline to define the roles of the team and to ensure that each person’s responsibilities are clear.

Source: Adobe Stock Images
An effective AEP or CCP should be flexible enough to deal with fast-evolving technological change. Airports should develop an “Initial Actions” document. This one-page tactical tool for airport employees can be laminated, and a copy should be in every airport vehicle, fuel truck, fire department rig, communications center, and EOC (if applicable), as well as at various locations on the airfield. Every employee should have a personal copy.

The AEP and CCP should provide simple, clear, scalable procedures to promote accurate, timely information throughout the airport. These plans should also address collaboration between the airport, its partners, and its customers. The plans will also need exercises, evaluation, and an application of lessons learned from actual incidents, other exercises, and reviews. This continuous improvement process is essential, and the review of these plans is most effective when it is carried out at regular intervals.

8.2 Responders and Mutual Aid Partners

Effective communication between first responders is critical for saving lives and protecting property. Any inability to communicate causes confusion in deploying resources. It also affects the safety of responders, and can lead to a lack of situational awareness by the incident commander. Critical information must be transmitted to responders, and recipients should confirm receipt of the information. Until confirmation, no one should assume that those in need of the information have received it.

Relying on a single form of communication can result in failure, so airport operators should consider every option available. Options include landline telephones, private branch exchange (PBX), voice over internet protocol (VoIP), mobile radios, cellular phones, smartphones, tablets, modems, and satellite communications including GPS.

All airport and mutual-aid partners and receiving medical facilities should have interoperable radio and other communications equipment. The time to determine interoperability is before an incident, not during. Airport operators should work with local mutual-aid providers to coordinate a schedule for testing radio compatibility. Monthly tests are recommended. Development of a spreadsheet can allow for inventory of all current radio systems and tracking compatibility, to better understand which systems are interoperable and where issues are most likely to occur.

Surge drills should also be conducted periodically. These test the current system’s capabilities and determine the maximum number of calls that can be taken before they begin to be dropped by service providers.

The article “Emergency Communications Best Practices,” published by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) in 2012, advises municipalities to carefully assess communication infrastructure and emergency plans. Successful recovery starts with planning for emergencies, and includes tests of communication capabilities during annual tabletop and triennial exercises. An airport that needs to leverage commercial or private networks, applications, or solutions should investigate these critical questions:

---

- Is the cell site infrastructure robust enough to survive emergency incidents in the region’s geography? Is there redundancy in the cellular system?
- What system assets are available to restore service if an outage occurs? What are the rules for deploying them? What are the costs?
- Does the application or network have any points of potential failure?

**INCOMING CALL MANAGEMENT**

A massive influx of people contacting the same dispatch system can result in unclear or missed transmissions, misunderstandings, or overwhelmed networks, which can further compromise safety and security. Therefore, telecommunications personnel should be trained on how to screen and prioritize calls, what calls can be released, what calls need to be maintained, and that initial communications with first responders will be limited.

Dedicated phone lines should be reserved for emergency dispatch and information. Train personnel to use emergency lines only when priority responses are necessary to request law enforcement, EMS, and fire fighters. Emergency lines can be set to have different ringtones to the priority and sources of calls. Radio users can be trained to indicate “emergency traffic” on calls when priority responses from dispatchers is needed.

To aid with call management during emergencies, airport operators should apply for the federal Wireless Priority Service (WPS) program. Under WPS, carriers are allowed to rank the level of importance of wireless calls within their network. Authorized WPS users enable their device to receive queuing priority over standard callers. The WPS is not disaster specific and can be activated at any time. There is an enrollment process, activation fee, monthly fee, and per minute charge associated with the service. For more information visit the WPS site at [www.fcc.gov/general/wireless-priority-service-wps](http://www.fcc.gov/general/wireless-priority-service-wps) or contact DHS at 866-627-2255.

### 8.3 Airport Personnel

Airport personnel play an important role in responding to an active shooter. Because these incidents unfold quickly, little or no time is available to coordinate responses by security, law enforcement, or other employees. Managers must already have plans for responding to an active shooter. They must also ensure that all personnel can practice the plans’ directives.

Responders and airport personnel must understand who to contact and when. Developing a pocket guide for field officers, to provide a quick-reference of important incident-related information, can assist with following proper procedures in high stress situations.

Effective messaging during the response to an active shooter can improve the recovery. The information provided must be clear and concise for intended recipients to respond in the appropriate way. Notifications should include information about what airport personnel should do. Messages should identify safe areas, making it possible to lock down other areas of a targeted facility and limiting the impact of the incident.

### 8.4 Passengers and Victims

Ensuring the passengers and visitors in the airport receive accurate and effective information is a significant challenge during an emergency. Clear communication and messaging positively impacts mental clarity and behavioral response during and after a shooting. Public announcement systems,
portable speakers, and visual messaging are effective ways to improve communication in support of evacuating and sheltering those in danger or at risk.

High-volume announcements are needed during a shooting, given the level of noise in the immediate area of the shooter. Areas adjacent to the shooter can be addressed using standard formats (media screens, loudspeakers). Cell phone alerts and social media messages can also be used to broadcast information on how to behave. Messages should be short and direct since there is little time.

The use of previously scripted and prerecorded messages can expedite communications during emergencies. In all cases, use clear simple language and work towards standard messaging in your own organization.

Social media and the internet have made unified messaging easier, and programs are available that can post information simultaneously in multiple formats. Emergency web pages (especially for mobile devices), controlled by the airport operator, are another effective way to provide information that can quickly be updated. See Section 8.9 for more information on the use of social media.

8.5 Public Information Officer (PIO)

The PIO, one of the major commanding officers established by the ICS, is the key individual responsible for warnings and release of public information and for warnings during an active shooter incident. The PIO serves as the communications coordinator and spokesperson for Incident Command and is responsible for providing information to the public, the media, and responders as needed. PIOs also require training on their role in an incident, effective communications, stakeholder engagement, their own safety and security, and customer service.

8.6 Media

Establishing effective working relationships with the media prior to an emergency can help during the emergency, by providing another means to warn of public safety issues, to prevent traffic congestion, and to enlist additional resources if needed.

It is recommended to develop positive media relationships during normal day-to-day operations and planning. Airport operators should work to keep the media informed in ongoing events and campaigns, and provide status updates during normal operations. A contact list for media outlets provides the airport operator with a quick way to alert local media after hours.

To assist in developing relationships, media courtesy tours can be provided for the EOC, the JIC, and staging areas, to show them designated locations and to answer their questions about how information will be disseminated during an emergency. Training can be provided on reporting processes during an incident, and to explain the expected role of the media during an emergency and define the ways they can assist in an effective response and recovery. Media should also be included in training exercises, such as the triennial full-scale exercises, to provide both community outreach and training on how incidents involve mutual aid partners.

---

3 The JIC is kept separate from the airport EOC, the policy group, and other strategic functions. The locations of airport EOCs and the policy group should be considered SSI, as anyone intending harm can use a localized incident to cause an EOC activation in order to conduct an attack on top airport representatives in a confined area.
When developing messages for press briefings, all associated agencies must collaborate, preferably at a JIC. Press briefings are typically preapproved and potentially delivered by the airport manager and other top officials. Ensuring “one message one voice” is vital to avoid confusion or conflicting information.

Summary of Recommendations:

- Maintain intentional relationships with media, who can be invaluable in crises.
- Keep the media informed of on-going events, campaigns, and status during normal operations.
- Create a contact list so your airport can alert local media at any time.
- Arrange courtesy tours of the JIC and staging areas.
- Train the local media on the airport reporting process and what will be done during an incident.
- Include local media in airport training exercises where they can observe how incidents are managed by the airport and mutual aid partners, and ensure they know their role if an incident occurs.
- Indicate one central location where the media should stage.

8.7 The Community and the Public

During an incident, communication is critical to help the community and public track the status of the event and prevent disinformation from spreading.

The Integrated Public Alert Warning System (IPAWS) provides public safety officials with an effective way to alert and warn the public about serious emergencies. They can use the Emergency Alert System, Wireless Emergency Alerts, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Weather Radio, and other public alert systems, all from a single interface. Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial alerting authorities can use IPAWS and integrate local systems that use Common Alerting Protocol standards with the IPAWS infrastructure.

Social media can also be used to relay information to the masses quickly. See Section 8.9 for additional information on the use of social media.

The airport’s websites and social media accounts are increasingly important to disseminate emergency and preparedness information, and can also be a vehicle for the media and the public to inquire about an incident, which can provide the airport with useful information and feedback. Emergency and preparedness information may include press releases, situation reports, maps, and other forms of emergency information.

Members of the community will also need a way to contact the airport or law enforcement with information regarding the incident, or to submit questions or feedback. Hotlines, websites, and social media can also be used for members of the media and public to submit inquiries during an incident.

8.8 Overcoming Communication Barriers

Emergency notifications should be made in a variety of formats, so that they are accessible to everyone.

PEOPLE WITH HEARING & VISUAL IMPAIRMENTS

During an emergency, an airport’s flight information terminals can display emergency instructions, including those for evacuation. Using IPAWS, the airport may send or request a mass notification to all
cell phones in a specific geographic area, to alert users and provide instructions about the emergency. Airport operators should also consider:

- Auditory announcements to alert and provide instructions to people in the terminal
- Adding flashing strobe lights as a component of the fire alarm system
- Visual and vibrating alerts for people who are hearing impaired
- Alternative measures for people who are sight impaired
- Cards with text and picture-based emergency messages and symbols

NON-NATIVE ENGLISH SPEAKERS

The assumption that non-native English speakers understand emergency messages in English can lead to disastrous outcomes, especially during an active shooter incident. In emergencies, communication breakdowns between first responders and non-native speakers can result in anxiety, fear, frustration, and overall loss of control.

Communications boards that present messages in multiple languages are among the most helpful tools for communicating in the field. They allow first responders and others to communicate through words and pictures. Airports should identify bilingual or multilingual airport badged personnel to assist with planning, and train them on how they can help during an emergency. Signs in terminals should have instructions in languages of all destinations served by the airport, especially in international terminals.

8.9 Social Media

Active shooter incidents evolve quickly and require fast and simple messaging to engage the public. Social media has proven to be expedient and a valuable tool in that regard. The speed of social media to warn of emergency situations—especially with an active shooter—could give the public the extra minutes they might need to protect themselves from harm.

Although conventional media (e.g., print, radio, TV) is heavily used in an emergency incident, major news outlets will also turn to social media for timely updates and comments, which may reduce the burden on the PIO’s staff.

Airport operators must be careful not to risk credibility by providing unvetted information. They should provide broad, general information until more detailed information becomes available. If resources allow, airport operators should utilize social media monitors to proactively search out postings or trending topics that may relate to the airport or the incident. Postings that include false information, even if unintentional, could lead to unnecessary panic or harm. It is important to monitor postings and topics to ensure misinformation is corrected or removed in a timely manner.

A Facebook feature called Safety Check may be automatically activated during an incident. It prompts users in the vicinity of the incident to publicly mark themselves as “safe.” Information like this is open-source data, which can be used by various agencies.

Recommendations for communicating via social media include:

- Post only facts and any necessary calls for action.
- Provide locations where the media should stage.
- Control the narrative. General statements are acceptable early in a crisis.
• When the incident is over, give updates on the status of the suspect, the building or location, and any other pertinent details.
• Use all available media to report the same information.

8.10 Communications After an Incident

Communication levels after an active shooter incident vary depending on the severity of the incident, but information on certain topics is always necessary. Airport operations, law enforcement, and other agencies must ensure that affected passengers and personnel know the status of recovery efforts. Often social media is a good resource to disseminate this information.

Another key component for communication is reclaiming personal items. By establishing a contact phone number specific to the Lost and Found office, individuals can call to reclaim their items. This process can be managed by airport operations, airlines, or a third party.

For reclaiming abandoned property, it should be left to the airlines to communicate with their passengers. The airport operator can assist by providing simple messaging to direct passengers to check with their respective airlines.

Next-of-kin notifications and any medical questions (e.g., which hospital is a person being treated, etc.) that affect loved ones should be made by law enforcement or the designated agency that has the authority to make this type of communication; airport operations personnel typically do not have the legal authority or the proper training. All parts of the notification process must comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
SECTION 9: MENTAL HEALTH CONSIDERATIONS

Provision of mental and behavioral health support services is an important consideration in the immediate aftermath of an active shooter incident, as well as in the long-term recovery process for those affected. It is important to understand that:

- Witnesses, bystanders, and others who are emotionally harmed by the incident are all victims who may need emotional and psychological assistance
- Disaster trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can be long-term conditions
- First responders are subject to trauma and may need specific psychological services

Areas of consideration for airports include:

- Ensuring Employee Assistance Programs (EAP) are robust and available. If an airport does not have such a program, local counselors and clergy can be effective options for addressing grief, financial, and legal issues. Airport operators must be prepared to provide employees with information on available victim assistance programs and workers compensation claims.
- Developing immediate, short-term, and long-term follow up for potential victims of psychological trauma, many of whom may have traveled away from the airport
- Ensuring some staff, responders, and mental health providers have training in Psychological First Aid (PFA) or a similar method. This is often administered in the initial recovery after a shooting, in a similar timeframe as the non-urgent medical response.

The resilience of airport staff, the traveling public, and the whole community begins with a comprehensive program to address mental health needs after an incident, including follow up. This program can be expanded as necessary with the authority and funding to sustain and expand such a program. Depth, size, and budget must be scalable for each airport’s needs, budgets, and abilities.

9.1 Psychological First Aid

The primary first response for mental health treatment after disasters is PFA, which is an accepted method of providing techniques to immediately lower a person’s distress. It offers basic comfort and safety, and can be provided by trained volunteers and non-professionals or professionals onsite. Many first responders are trained in PFA or similar approaches. A separate approach used less frequently but growing in use is called the Trauma Resiliency Model® (TRM).

Beyond PFA and TRM, follow-up is necessary for traumatized individuals. Links for PFA and mental health resources can be provided through the airport’s social media accounts and website. Research shows their effectiveness in improving community resilience and social solidarity, especially for those lacking services or living in remote areas.

As soon as possible, notify the airport mental health committee or response team, the American Red Cross, and local, state, and national psychological associations. These organizations can notify their disaster-response volunteer PFA/TRM and support teams. Here are key websites for information:

- Red Cross: [https://www.redcross.org/get-help.html](https://www.redcross.org/get-help.html)
- Trauma Resource Institute: [https://www.traumaresourceinstitute.com/research](https://www.traumaresourceinstitute.com/research)
9.1.1 General Procedural Recommendations

Checklists are helpful to remind personnel of steps to take in administering aid. Emergencies push cortisol and adrenaline into the body, which can cloud judgment and cognition, and affect behavior. Checklists help to unify the behavioral response, and are a part of stress-management training.

Prepare the appropriate or rehearsed staging area for the psychological response team (PFA, TRM, etc.) Review the knowledge of vulnerable areas, populations, and methods to cover those with disabilities (Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA] compliance) and children, and respond accordingly.

As an all-clear is given, first responders and airport staff who are trained in PFA/TRM can begin helping victims. These groups will likely be on scene before Red Cross and psychological association volunteers arrive. Six principles of trauma intervention apply in the aftermath of a shooting incident, and are included in PFA/TRM.

1) A sense of safety
2) Calming
3) A sense of self and community efficacy
4) Connectedness
5) Hope
6) Help

Repeatedly discussing an incident with victims and witnesses can retraumatize them, especially outside a private therapeutic space. Avoid retraumatizing victims and witnesses with repeated questioning and interviewing. Create a single interview process used by all investigative agencies, or at least reduce to as few interviews as possible, and include mental health specialists in the witness interview process. Victims and their families need a safe, secure area where the media have no access. When relocating them from one area to another, determine a route with no visibility of the original scene.

9.2 Extended Mental Health Recovery and Follow-Up Treatment

Recovery needs for victims of trauma can be long-term, and mental health and behavioral strategies are recommended for every stage of an airport active shooter incident. Designing a comprehensive disaster mental health program is recommended, and can be scaled for each airport.

Considerations for ongoing psychological services should include a mental health advisory committee and a professional response team, to assist in coordinating the unique mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery challenges that airports may face. This can be in conjunction with local services, volunteer organizations like the American Red Cross, and local mental health professionals and associations.

With a comprehensive disaster mental health program in place, the airport can reach out to victims and the extended community, inform them of available resources, and coordinate services from multiple providers and state and local agencies. An airport mental health program can also monitor and ensure that those who might need assistance are getting it. Providing information and access to such treatment is a best practice for recovery.
A method should also be designed for long-term follow-up with both local and out of town victims because PTSD and Acute Stress Disorder may last a long time and require professional follow-up treatment. People will have left the region, or those who are traumatized might not know what to do. Readily available information will help them receive the resources and support they need. Appropriate airport operations and the mental health advisory committee should take the lead in coordinating outreach methods due to their specialized knowledge of airport culture, training, and access to contact information (flight manifests, witness lists, etc.)

People around the country vary in sociodemographic and economic resources and resilience, so referral to for-pay, insurance-based, low-cost, and free treatment must be addressed in follow-up plans. Referral to clinicians trained in crisis, disaster, and trauma treatment is a best practice recommendation for follow-up treatment, but any supportive counseling will help if a trauma specialist is not at first available. First responders often need specific types of treatment referrals, and a sensitivity to their job-culture stigma against mental health issues is important to address.

Finally, access to healthcare correlates with post-traumatic treatment satisfaction and therefore is a benefit to the community at large. Post-disaster follow-up and referral needs to be an airport priority. A Mental Health Checklist is provided in Appendix D of this guidebook.

### 9.3 Community Recovery

Closure is any interaction, information, or practice that allows a person to feel that a traumatic, upsetting, or confusing life event has been resolved. Airport operators can evaluate the community status after an active shooter incident and consider holding a public grief ceremony, placing a temporary or permanent memorial, or holding a reopening ceremony.

Ceremonies show acknowledgement of an incident. The airport operator can provide social support for the family members of victims by helping to honor the memory of those who died. For many, the process of community grieving and understanding that they are not alone in their pain is an important step towards healing.

Temporary memorials at the attack site (such as curbside or in baggage claim) allow for a statement of support and empathy to be expressed for the victims after an active shooter incident. However, when left long term, they become a painful and constant reminder to passengers and personnel. Airports should work with victims’ families, staff, and local community leaders to evaluate the installation of an appropriate permanent memorial to honor those lost.

A reopening ceremony shows resilience and assists in the rebuilding of trust in the airport. The event solidifies closure of a negative situation and the hope that comes with a new beginning. When feasible, airports may want to consider making changes, such as remodeling, prior to the reopening of impacted areas in an effort to reduce re-traumatizing those affected, especially returning staff and frequent flyers.

It is important to monitor memorial sites and services supported by the airport to ensure control of media.
SECTION 10: LEVERAGING EXISTING AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY

Many types of existing and emerging technology are useful for airport security and can be leveraged to mitigate and respond to an active shooter incident.

AUDIO-VIDEO CALL BOXES

The use of emergency audio-video call boxes throughout the airport allows callers to directly contact the emergency response center to request assistance and provide details about an emergency. Open microphones and cameras on these devices call boxes provide immediate information from the scene directly to the dispatcher.

CCTV/CAMERA SYSTEMS

Many airports have invested in CCTV or other video surveillance systems that may be used in conjunction with video analytics. These can be used to better monitor and protect critical facility access points, as well as to document activity within an area. If an active shooter is in the airport, every second counts in stopping the assault. Locating the shooter as quickly as possible is paramount for deploying armed personnel and saving lives. Check with your airport’s legal counsel prior to installing cameras with sound capabilities as they are not legal in all jurisdictions.

DRONES AND MICRO-DRONES

Drones or unmanned aerial vehicles may be used for many purposes, including increased situational awareness on the airport campus during response and recovery efforts. PARAS 0012 Guidance for Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into Airport Security has more information on this topic.

SHOT DETECTION SYSTEMS

Shot detection systems can greatly reduce the time between the first shot and the notification of law enforcement and people inside the airport. Effective shot detection alarms automatically activate surveillance in real time. They can also be integrated with access control systems, to limit movement of the shooter. There are a number of these systems on the market with varying capabilities and price points.
SECTION 11: LAYOUTS AND OTHER SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Although the probability of being involved in an airport active shooter incident is minimal, airports still must prepare for the possibility and remain vigilant in the hope of preventing one. One way to begin mitigation is to first identify high-risk areas, or potential targets, across the airport campus. The next step is to identify areas where passengers could go for protection.

11.1 Identifying High-Risk Areas Around the Airport

Most incidents occur where there is public access (pre-security) and a large number of potential victims, such as areas near ticket counters, waiting areas, terminal curbside, and baggage claim. PARAS 0013 Managing Congestion in Public Areas to Mitigate Security Vulnerabilities provides solutions to minimize congestion, which may reduce the number of casualties during an active shooter incident.

11.2 Safe Rooms

When evacuation is not possible, people in the vicinity of an active shooter must attempt to hide. Identifying existing rooms for use, or installing designated safe rooms, will help ensure there are options for taking cover.

When installing a designated safe room, it should be reinforced with thick walls, solid, locking doors, and no interior glass or windows. Safe rooms should be equipped with trauma kits, communication devices, telephones, and duress alarms. Every airport can implement the use of designated safe rooms, but feasibility depends on the current layout and available funding. For new terminals, or when remodeling current structures, safe rooms can be included in the design.

Inside any rooms that might be used for safe retreat in lieu of a complete safe room, there should be written instructions for the occupants to:

1. Lock and/or barricade doors
2. Turn off all lights
3. Close blinds and cover interior windows
4. Remain quiet (silence electronic devices)
5. Lie on the floor
6. Silently communicate with first responders (e.g., text messaging, place signs in exterior windows with the status of the room’s occupants, etc.)
7. Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law enforcement officers
11.3 Protective Devices

Long views and crowded areas create opportunity for shooters to harm more people. A wide range of protective devices are available for use by airports, to add options for cover in an active shooter incident. Permanent floor-to-ceiling bulletproof walls or glass provide a long-term, low-maintenance barrier. Lightweight modular ballistic screens, which can also serve as bulletin boards, can be erected and dismantled quickly. These can be strategically placed to provide protection for individuals at security checkpoints, ticketing areas, baggage claim, and to limit skip.

During terminal renovation or construction, reinforced counters, podiums, and terminal seating are available to provide enhanced protection when escape is not an option. Advertisements or artwork offer other potential ways to provide physical concealment without disturbing to the overall aesthetics of the airport.
APPENDIX A: FIELD OPERATING GUIDE FOR RECOVERY AND RESTORATION

This field operating guide (FOG) is a tool for airport operations to use before, during, and after an active shooter incident. It is intended to supplement current emergency plans, and aid in identifying key tasks and procedures for a safe response, mitigation of impacts, and an expeditious recovery. Airport operators should develop their own specific FOGs and amend them as necessary when response plans change, to meet operational or response requirements.

FOGs can be developed for each level of response authority. They should include sections for responding to and recovering from an active shooter. Ideally, the FOGs should be developed for the Incident Command Post, the EOC, and responders who are deployed on-scene. Here is a basic outline for a FOG:

GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Roles and Responsibilities
   a. Command Structure
   b. Designation of Authority
   c. Reporting Requirements
2. Operations Checklist
   a. Documentation
      i. Inspection Forms
         — Terminal
         — Airfield
         — Perimeter
         — Parking
         — Other
      ii. Time Record
      iii. Damage Report
   iv. Work Order
      v. Sanitation (Biohazard)
   b. Personal Checklist
      i. Self-Care/Mental Status
      ii. PPE
      iii. Equipment
         — Radio(s)
         — Phone
         — Camera
         — Other

EVALUATE AIRPORT CAPABILITY
1. Establish Current Baseline of Operational Status
   a. Diagram
      i. Unimpacted Areas
      ii. Impacted Areas
      iii. Infrastructure
      iv. Utilities
v. Communication Systems
vi. Security Access Control
vii. Baggage
viii. Supporting Agencies
   1. TSA
   2. FAA
   3. Customs and Border Protection

**STEPS NEEDED TO RESUME OPERATIONS**

1. Prioritize assignments
2. Develop a timeline for each step
3. Track progress
APPENDIX B: RECOVERY PLANNING PROCESS AND PLAN CHECKLIST

B.1 Planning Process

This planning process is a general guide to ensure that any plan developed will address possible threats and hazards for all key stakeholders. A process ensures accountability for goals and objectives, roles and responsibilities, and any mutual aid provided during relief. The steps for an effective planning process are as follows:

1. Form an Emergency Planning Team
   - Conduct threat assessment as appropriate
   - Prioritize planning, training, and exercising efforts
   - Coordinate efforts as needed with other agencies
   - Develop, integrate, or and update all emergency plans and procedures
   - Develop and update agreements with other agencies and mutual aid partners
   - Provide training to the airport authority, stakeholders, and the community
   - Design, coordinate, organize, and sponsor operations and exercises.
   - Review and approve the plan
   - Share the plan
   - Implement and maintain

2. Evacuation Plan
   - Roles and responsibilities
   - Controlled and uncontrolled evacuations
   - Airport-wide evacuations
   - Fire/HAZMAT incidents
   - Security incidents
   - Lockdown, lockout, and shelter-in-place
   - Mass hysteria concerns
   - Assembly areas
   - Medical needs
   - Individuals with disabilities, or access and functional needs

3. Asset Identification
   - Stakeholders
   - Contractors
   - Physical assets of internal stakeholders
   - Physical assets of external stakeholders
   - Identify gaps
   - Fill the gaps
   - Deconflict competing resources amongst stakeholders
   - Assign responsibility for each asset to an internal command
   - Prepare agreements
   - Prepare procurement procedures
   - Revisit and reassess asset availability annually
4. Pre-Identified Staging
   - Responders
     o Codified in associated plans
     o Visual aids
     o Segregating resources based upon mission
       ▪ Fire
       ▪ Law enforcement
       ▪ Medical transport
   - Non-First Responders
     o DOT (barriers and signage)
     o Public works
     o Bus and public transportation
     o Taxi and livery services
   - People
     o Passengers
     o Families
     o Operator
     o Stakeholders
     o Tenants
     o Contractors
     o Employees
   - Media
     o Identify Public Information Officers
     o Provide defined media staging areas away from the scene
     o Communicate and build relationships with the media
     o Ensure the media can get the information they need in a single location

5. Gate Closure
   - Identify gates likely to be impacted
   - Identify gates not likely to be impacted
   - Identify trigger points for closing gates
   - Identify trigger points for opening gates
   - Identify timeline necessary for each trigger point
   - Identify course of action for each trigger point
   - Consider long term closures

6. Communications
   - Messaging and information gathering
   - Roles and responsibilities to provide messaging
   - What messaging needs to occur and when
     o Airport personnel
     o Responders and their agencies
     o Civilians
     o Passengers
     o Stakeholders
     o Media
     o Politicians
• Method for delivery
  o Public safety radio
  o Changeable message boards
  o Public address systems
  o Text message systems
  o Web portal
  o Commercial radio and TV
  o Social media

B.2 Plan Checklist

Section I: Introduction and Background
a. Introductory Material
   i. Introduce the plan and how it is constructed
   ii. Historical and statistical information
   iii. Airport Threat Assessment as it relates to active shooter
b. Purposes and Situation Overview
   i. Identify the purpose of the plan
   ii. Operational Overview

Section II: Concept of Operations
a. Emergency Management Process
b. Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities
c. Direction, Control, and Coordination
   i. Internal
   ii. Interoperable Coordination
d. Information Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination
e. Resource Management
f. Training Exercises
g. Sharing Information with First Responders
h. Administration, Finance, and Logistics
i. Plan Development and Maintenance
j. Authorities and References

Section III: Critical Operational Functional Annexes
a. Crisis and Emergency Risk Communications (CERC) Annex
   i. Alert, Notification, and Warning
   ii. Operational Communications, Strategies, Equipment, Communications Plans and Flows
   iii. Internal Communications, Internal Staff, Responders, Tenants, Stakeholders
   iv. External Communications, Media, Social Media, Traveling and General Public
   v. Joint Information System Operations
b. Evacuation Annex
   i. Terminal/Facility
      1. Uncontrolled vs. Controlled
2. Fire/HazMat vs. Security Threat
   ii. Airport-Wide
   iii. Traffic Strategies

c. Sheltering Annex
   i. Lockdown
   ii. Shelter-in-Place
   iii. Victim Assistance Center
   iv. Family Assistance Center

d. Continuity of Operations Annex
   i. Ground Services
   ii. Terminal and Facility Services
   iii. Airfield Services
   iv. Security
   v. Maintenance

e. Recovery Annex
   i. Short-Term
   ii. Long-Term
APPENDIX C: TRAINING AIDS

Training aids can be a valuable learning tool for all responders. The training aids should support the response and recovery plans developed by the airport operator. Remember that plans should be developed by following a whole-community approach, to ensure all roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and to avoid any duplication of effort when plans are acted on.

C.1 Designing Tabletop Drills and Exercises

1. Exercise Planning Team and Events
   - Exercise Planning Team Considerations
   - Exercise Planning Team Positions

2. Planning Activities
   - Concept and Objectives Meeting
   - Initial Planning Meeting
   - Midterm Planning Meeting
   - Master Scenario Events List Meeting
   - Final Planning Meeting

3. Exercise Design
   - Scope
     - Exercise Type
     - Participation Level
     - Exercise Duration
     - Exercise Parameters
   - Exercise Objectives
   - Evaluation Requirements
   - Scenario
     - Threat or Hazard
     - Modeling or Simulation
   - Exercise Documentation
     - Situation Manual
     - Facilitator Guide
     - Multimedia Presentation
     - Exercise Plan
     - Player Handout
     - Controller and Evaluator Handbook
     - Controller and Evaluator Packets
     - Master Scenario Events List (MSEL)
     - Extent of Play Agreements
     - Exercise Evaluation Guides
     - Participation Feedback Form
     - Waiver Forms
     - Weapons and Safety Policy
   - Media or Public Affairs Guidance
     - Press Release
     - Public Announcement
4. Exercise Development
   • Planning for Exercise Logistics
     o Venue
       ▪ Facility and Room
       ▪ Audio/Visual Requirements
       ▪ Suppliers, Food, and Refreshments
       ▪ Badging and Identification
       ▪ Registration and Table/Breakout Identification
     o Actors
       ▪ Waiver Forms
       ▪ Actor Instructions
       ▪ Symptomology Cards
   • Parking, Transportation, and Designated Areas
     o Exercise Assembly Area
     o Operation Area
     o Response Route
     o Observation/Media Area
   • Planning for Exercise Control
   • Staffing
     o Control Structure and Simulation Cell
     o Controller Training
     o Communications Plan
   • Safety and Security
     o Safety
     o Security
     o Exercise Parameters
   • Plan for How Exercise will be Evaluated

C.2 Conducting Tabletop Drills and Exercises

1. Exercise Play Preparation
   • Setup for Discussion-Based Exercises
     o Situation manuals
     o Multimedia presentation
     o A/V equipment
     o Table tents for each table
     o Name tents for each person
     o Badges
     o Sign-in sheets
     o Participant feedback forms
   • Setup for Operations-Based Exercises
   • Briefings
     o Policy Group Briefing
     o Controller/Evaluator Briefing
- Actor Briefing
- Player Briefing
- Observer Briefing

- Exercise Play
- Participant Roles and Responsibilities
  - Exercise Director
  - Evaluator
  - Lead Evaluator
  - Facilitator
  - Controller
  - Senior Controller
  - Safety Controller
  - Exercise Assembly Area Controller
  - Simulator
  - Observer
  - Player
  - Actor

- Conduct for Discussion-Based Exercises
  - Multimedia Presentation
  - Facilitated Discussion
  - Moderated Discussion
  - Exercise Data Collection

- Conduct for Operations-Based Exercises
  - Control
  - Exercise Data Collection

- Contingency Process

2. Wrap-Up Activities
- Debriefings
- Player Hot Wash
- Controller/Evaluator Debriefing

C.3 Five-Minute ROC Training Drills

A Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill is a timed walk-through of a plan involving the stakeholders and first responders. It allows the participants to visualize their intended actions and how they should respond to various operational situations. This process prevents confusion about how the plan is to be implemented. It may resolve any blue-on-blue conflict that could occur, and it could lead to changes in the AEP. Participants should include the principals, down to two levels below the principals, and any others with critical roles to play. A ROC drill is timed to promote synchronization of action—what, when, and where responders will perform their duties.
The following sample training sheet can be printed to take attendance and show the information discussed during training.

**DATE** ___________ **TIME** ___________ **LOCATION** ______________________________________________

**IN ATTENDANCE:**

<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOPICS COVERED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Completed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exercise scope, objectives, and core capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant roles and responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of conduct</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety issues, emergency codes and phrases, safety controller responsibilities, prohibited activities, and weapons policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of and access to the exercise site</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications (e.g., radio frequencies or channels)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration, date, and time of exercise and schedule of events</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maps and directions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D: MENTAL HEALTH RECOVERY CHECKLIST

1. Begin with staging and providing Psychological First Aid (PFA) / Trauma Resiliency Model (TRM) following the six principles and with attention to vulnerable areas/populations/ADA/children.
2. Coordinate airport disaster mental health committee and response professionals with Red Cross, psychological associations, local Department of Mental Health, and volunteer providers.
3. Connect victims to specific social media sources for PFA and mental health support. Research shows their effectiveness in improving community resilience and social solidarity, especially for those lacking services or for those living in remote areas.
4. Provide resources for community gatherings that are starting or that already exist regarding disaster recovery, future planning, safety, etc.
5. Identify differences between those who will be traveling away and those staying in the area, including airport and vendor staff, and first responders.
6. Execute a plan to gather contact information for witnesses and bystanders after the incident. This will provide a way to follow up for later assessment and treatment if needed.
7. Provide a guide or pamphlet and website to victims on how to find treatment later. This should include:
   - Call 211 (social services information).
   - Call Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s National Disaster Distress Helpline at 1-800-985-5990.
   - Call your insurance provider (if you have one) for instructions or a referral for behavioral health services. Any therapy helps, but a person trained in crisis, disaster, and trauma is recommended.
   - Call your doctor.
   - Call a friend who has seen a therapist in the past.
   - Go to a free or low-cost clinic.
   - Contact a university (they often have training sites for new therapists).
   - If you must wait or all else fails, talk to safe friends and family face-to-face.
   - Engage in community gatherings.
   - Use specified social media support sites.
   - Call the Suicide Prevention Crisis Line (1-800-273-8255 [scheduled to become 988 by July 2022]).
   - First responders, call the Suicide Prevention Crisis Line or reach out to your department. Note that you should seek out treatment from people specifically trained for your work.
8. Airport Disaster Mental Health Committee and Response professionals should assist airport staff, vendors, and the community with ongoing treatment access and activities.
9. Execute a specific plan for attention to first responders’ immediate and follow-up care.

Recovery can be a long-term process for some people, so time-stepped follow-up is necessary for passengers, staff, and first responders. The following are important considerations:

- Staff may be reluctant to return to work until they feel safe; some may not want to return at all.
• Staff and passengers may have somber feelings of what transpired in the location of the scene.
• Staff and passengers may experience PTSD.
• Organizations (tenants and stakeholders) should have some type of Employee Assistance Program (EAP) to assist with crisis and grief counseling.
• Airports should ensure EAPs are adequate to account for active shooter incidents.
• Some staff are more resilient than others and do not display signs of stress.
• Airports should utilize non-profit organizations to assist.
• Airports should consider establishing and managing victim assistance funding campaigns to help cover the costs for long-term care.
• A well-established program can assist in providing initial mental trauma support to victims and responders (PFA/TRM).
APPENDIX E: ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

E.1 ACRP Publications

Refer to http://www.trb.org/Publications/PubsACRPPublications.aspx

- Research Report 171: Establishing a Coordinated Local Family Assistance Program for Airports
- Research Report 201: Airport Emergency Communications for People with Disabilities and Others with Access and Functional Needs
- Synthesis 60: Airport Emergency Post-Event Recovery Practices
- Synthesis 65: Practices to Develop Effective Stakeholder Relationships at Smaller Airports
- Report 153: Guidebook for IROPS Stakeholder Communication & Coordination

E.2 Government Resources

- Air Force Be Ready: Active Shooter: https://www.beready.af.mil/Disasters-Emergencies/Man-Made-Incident/Active-Shooter/
- DHS Active Shooter Preparedness: http://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness
- DOJ Traumatic Incident Management: http://www.justice.gov/jmd/hr/hrorder/chpt7-2.htm
- FLETC – Active Shooter How to Respond, Supervisor Edition: http://www.co.lincoln.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/sheriff039s_office/page/3780/activeshooterhowtorepondonesupervisor.pdf
- Navy Active Shooter: https://www.ready.navy.mil/be_informed/terrorism/active_shooter.html
• HIPAA and FERPA reference cards with Privacy Rule information can be found at:
• DHS Active Shooter Pocket Cards information can be found at:
  http://www.dhs.gov/publication/active-shooter-pocket-card

E.3 Non-Federal Government Resources
The federal government does not officially endorse the organizations below or their products. These materials have been provided here for educational purposes only.

• Texas State University Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training:
  http://www.alerrt.org
• National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC):
  https://www.justnet.org/About_NLECTC.html
• Tactical Emergency Casualty Care website: http://www.e-tecc.org/
• Counseling Team International: http://www.thecounselingteam.com/
• International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (ICISF): http://www.icisf.org/
• Active Response Training: http://www.activeresponsetraining.net/
• Behavioral Threat Assessment:
  http://www.threatassessment.vt.edu/Implementing_Behavioral_Threat_Assessment.pdf
  http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/the%20police%20response%20to%20active%20shooter%20incidents%202014.pdf
• Stratfor Video Reacting to Active Shooter Situation:
  http://www.stratfor.com/video/conversation-reacting-armed-assailants
• New York City Police Department’s “Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation” 2012:

E.4 Foreign Resources

• A screening tool that was developed after an incident in New Zealand helps differentiate between those who are more likely to heal naturally from those who will need assistance:
Broward County Aviation Department Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport Active Shooter Incident and Post-Event Response January 6, 2017 After-Action Report August 15, 2017 pg.65


The National Response Team “Incident Command System/Unified Command System,” <https://www.nrt.org> sites>files>ICSUCTA.


Transportation Research Board. ACRP Synthesis 60: Airport Emergency Post-Incident Recovery Practices.